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ABSTRACT 
 
We study how the number of traders affects the interaction between a centralized 
exchange and bilateral negotiations in an experimental labor market with excess supply 
and incomplete contracts. Our large markets are three times as large as our small 
markets. In bilateral negotiations firms obtain information about employees’ 
performance in previous jobs. Though market forces put a downward pressure on wages 
in large markets, reciprocal tendencies do not differ. Hence, the occurrence of bilateral 
negotiations increases overall efficiency for both market sizes.  
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1. Introduction  
This paper studies how market size affects behavior in an experimental labor market 
with excess supply and incomplete contracts. In particular, we study how the number of 
agents in the market affects recruitment through the interaction between a centralized 
exchange and bilateral negotiations when moral hazard is a threat to market efficiency. 
Starting with Fehr et al. (1993) numerous papers have studied the case of a centralized 
exchange institution and have found considerable gift exchange and high efficiency 
levels. Gift exchange occurs when a firm shows trust in a worker by offering a high 
wage and the worker reciprocates this trust by exerting high effort. The original high 
wage offer may reflect a direct reciprocation of previous high efforts by the worker 
within the same firm (Fehr et al. 1993) or an indirect reciprocation of high efforts when 
previously employed by other firms (Schram et al. forthcoming). Only the latter type of 
gift exchange can occur in the recruitment of new personnel. It can be facilitated by the 
occurrence of bilateral negotiations in which firms obtain information about workers’ 
performance in previous jobs. Schram et al. (forthcoming) find that, when firms can 
choose between a centralized market and bilateral negotiations, they frequently opt to 
recruit through the latter, which yields higher efficiency levels than the market.  
These results were obtained with a relatively small market size involving two firms 
and five workers. In this paper we investigate how the results above are affected by 
increasing the size of the market. We think that this question is of substantial interest, 
since it is part of a larger issue of how market participation affects attitudes towards 
others and the ability to cooperate.1 One may expect a larger market size to modify 
participants’ perceptions about the interdependence between traders in the market. The 
complexity of exchange between more people may simply create an atmosphere of more 
anonymity and disconnectedness and induce more individualistic behavior (North, 
1993). We think that this is a socially important but difficult to analyze issue on which 
our experiment sheds some light. Moreover, if the proportion of buyers to sellers is the 
same in both markets (as is the case in our experiments) then the excess supply is – in 
absolute terms - larger in the larger market. This increases the pressure on the marginal 
trade and implies that market forces may be stronger in larger markets. Together with 
the increased individualism this yields a prediction of less gift exchange and results 
                                                 
1 See Bowles (1998) for a discussion of the possible effects of market participation on participants’ 
preferences. For experimental papers investigating issues in this line see Brandts and Charness (2004) and 
Brandts et al. (2009). 
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closer to the market equilibrium in the large markets. In this paper we submit this 
hypothesis to empirical scrutiny. 
The issue of market size and more generally number effects has been studied for 
other experimental environments. Isaac et al. (1994) study contributions to public goods 
with larger group sizes than the ones typically studied. Huck et al. (2004) analyze the 
effects of increasing the number of competitors in a quantity competition oligopoly 
setting. Both studies show that size matters. In the double auction of Smith (1962) the 
issue of numbers is also an important one. Here the important result is that even where 
numbers are “small” there are strong tendencies for the competitive equilibrium to be 
attained. 
We compare markets with seven to markets with 21 trading agents. We feel that 
multiplying the market size by three is a meaningful increase and that therefore our 
results are of interest. Of course, whether our results are robust to even larger increases 
remains an empirical question. Nevertheless, our market size of 21 is much larger than 
almost all previously studied laboratory markets. 
 Our results show that market size does not affect reciprocal tendencies. For both 
market sizes effort levels react significantly positively to wages. In addition, the 
marginal effects of a higher wage offer on effort are very similar in small and large 
markets. 
 
2. Design and Procedures 
The situation is presented as a market in which an abstract good is traded between 
buyers and sellers. Our design consists of two treatments, varying in market size. Our 
(five) small markets have 5 sellers and 2 buyers and our (four) large markets have 15 
sellers and 6 buyers. Given our focus on labor market recruitment, we will henceforth 
maintain the reference to ‘firms’ and ‘workers’ instead of buyers and sellers. 
 The experiments and their procedures are described in detail in Schram et al. 
(forthcoming). Here, we provide a brief description of the main features. Participants in 
the experiments interact during 30 market rounds; each subject has the constant role 
either of a firm or of a worker and can be involved in at most one trade per round. 
Hence, there can be at most two trades per market and round in the small markets and 
six in the large markets. Trade can take place in two ways: through a centralized market 
– i.c., a standard double auction (DA) – or through bilateral (private) negotiations (BN).  
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 In the first 10 rounds firms and workers interact only through DA, creating a 
benchmark to which we can compare the effects of bilateral negotiations. Firms and 
workers may anonymously make public wage proposals at any time during a market 
period (which lasts 90 seconds). Bids and asks consist of an integer between 0 and 50, 
inclusive. If a wage proposal is accepted then a match between a worker and a firm is 
established and they trade at wage wDA. After two such trades or 90 seconds (whichever 
comes first) the market closes. Then, the worker chooses an effort level (e) which can 
be either ‘high’ (e=1) or ‘low’ (e=0). This is communicated only to the firm and worker 
concerned. Participants know neither the identity of those making or accepting offers 
nor the history of any of the other market participants. 
 A firm’s payoff (πf) is equal to the revenue resulting from the worker’s effort,  r(e), 
minus the wage paid, πf=r(e)−wDA, where the revenue levels resulting from high and 
low effort are r(1)=50 and r(0)=10, respectively. A worker’s payoff (πl) is equal to the 
wage received minus the cost of effort c(e), πl=wDA−c(e), which is 20 for high effort 
(c(1)=20) and 0 for low effort (c(0)=0). Note that high effort maximizes the surplus 
from trade. 
 After the 10 market rounds, subjects receive new instructions for the subsequent 20 
rounds. At the beginning of each round of 90 seconds firms either enter the centralized 
market (the same DA as before) or propose bilateral negotiations. For every firm that 
proposes negotiations, one worker is randomly selected and asked whether (s)he wants 
to enter BN. After all workers have reacted BN and DA open simultaneously. All firms 
and workers that have not been paired for bilateral negotiations enter the centralized 
market.  
 In the firm-worker pairs engaged in BN each firm is informed about the number of 
times that the worker chose low effort and high effort in previous rounds. This 
information includes jobs initiated in DA but excludes the decisions of the first 10 
rounds without BN. Firms are not informed of wages earned previously by the worker. 
Firms and workers do not learn their partner’s identity in a matching. 
 After seeing the information about previous effort choices the firm makes a wage 
offer to the worker it is matched with, consisting of an integer between 0 and 50. 
Matched workers then accept wage wBN or reject the offer. Those involved in BN can at 
all times observe the bids and trades made in the market. In contrast, participants in the 
market are not informed about what is happening in the negotiations; this represents the 
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transparency of a market and the lack of it in bilateral negotiations. The firms whose 
offers are rejected and the workers that have rejected immediately enter DA, joining 
those that have not engaged in BN. After trades have been determined the workers 
involved make their effort decisions. This yields payoffs as described above, where wDA 
is replaced by wBN for trades in BN.  
 The computerized experiments were run at the CREED laboratory of the University 
of Amsterdam and by CREED at the laboratory of the São Paulo School of Economics 
(EESP) and the School of Business Administration (EAESP), with sessions of 
approximately 90 minutes with 119 participants. 
 
3. Results 
 Table 1 presents the key summary statistics of our results.  
Table 1: Key Summary Statistics 
  % of 
possible 
trades 
% trades in 
BN 
Average 
DA wage  
Average 
BN wage 
% high 
effort DA 
% high 
effort BN 
R1-10 96.0 -- 15.8 -- 26.0 -- Small R11-30 96.5 28.5 18.3 25.9 39.1 49.1 
R1-10 99.2 -- 5.85 -- 7.1 -- Large R11-30 99.0 44.3 8.70 23.71 17.7 52.9 
Notes.  R1-10: first 10 rounds; R11-30: rounds 11-30. % of possible trades: #realized trades as %of possible trades. 
% of trades in BN: #bilateral deals as %of realized trades. Average DA wage: average wage realized in DA; average 
BN wage= average wage in BN. % high effort DA= #high effort choices after DA trade as %of DA trades; % high 
effort BN= #high effort choices BN trade as %of BN trades. 
 
To start, consider wage patterns and reciprocal behavior. First, after the introduction of 
BN, the DA wage increases slightly but the BN wage is (much) higher than the DA 
wage. It can be easily seen that this pattern is the same in large markets as in small 
markets. Moreover, wages in BN are more or less independent of market size (the 
difference is statistically insignificant; p=0.46).2 In DA, as would be expected with 
excess supply, market forces seem to push wages down. They do so more in large 
markets than in small markets (until round 10 the difference is not significant, p=0.46; 
after round 10 wages are significantly lower in large markets; p=0.09).  
 In BN (both for large and small markets), firms indirectly reciprocate the worker’s 
previous effort choices. If a worker previously chose low effort more often than high 
effort, wages are low (below 6). If both levels were chosen equally often wages are 
much higher (25-30) and if high effort was chosen more often, wages are highest (30-
                                                 
2 Unless indicated otherwise we use Mann-Whitney test with the market as unit of observation (N=9).  
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35). There is also evidence of a direct reciprocal response (a high effort choice) to a 
high wage offer, as we will see shortly. 
 In both small and large markets the average effort level in DA increases after the 
introduction of BN. Moreover, the average effort level in BN is higher than the level 
reached in DA that takes place at the same time. Analyzing average effort levels over 
time separately for small and large markets shows that effort in BN is for both cases 
always above the one for DA.3  
  To test the origins of the differences in effort levels, Table 2 presents random 
effects probit regressions of effort choice on the relevant exogenous variables separately 
for small and large markets. The results show clearly that in both cases effort levels 
react significantly positively to wages. Bilateral negotiations as such do not have 
significant effect, their influence works through the positive effect on wages. 
Table 2: Random effects probit for effort choice 
 Small markets Large markets 
Variable Coefficient  
(z-value) 
Marginal effect Coefficient  
(z-value) 
Marginal effect 
Constant -7.670 (1.92) -- -1.908 (8.00)** -- 
(round-10)/10 -0.889 (3.07)** -- -1.072 (5.61)** -- 
(round-10)2/100 -0.221 (0.40) -- -0.932 (2.63)** -- 
BN  -5.625 (1.41) -- 0.747 (1.43) -- 
DAwage/10 2.429 (2.08)* 0.76 0.862 (8.78)** 0.74 
BNwage/10 4.053 (3.30)**  0.78 1.099 (6.66)** 0.83 
 
Notes. The table gives the estimated maximum likelihood coefficient vector β in )μβ'X(ΦPr jijt
ij
t +=  where ijtPr gives the 
probability that i of j chooses high effort in t. Φ denotes the cumulative normal distribution and X is the vector of independent 
variables. µj is a (white noise) market-specific error that corrects for the dependencies across individual decision in te same market. 
Absolute z-values are in parentheses. The marginal effect measures the change in the probability of high effort if a wage of 35 is 
offered instead of a wage of 5 (both calculated for round 20). * (**)=statistically significant 5%-(1%-)level.  
Table 2 also shows the marginal effects of higher wage offers on the probability of 
exerting high effort. This is separately estimated for trades in DA and BN. Note that a 
unitary wage increase is not relevant for the setup described here. A firm contemplating 
a high wage aimed at inducing high effort is not deciding between wages 5 and 6 (or 35 
and 36). Instead, she is considering offering a wage that will allow the worker to afford 
the costs of high effort (i.e., higher than 20) versus one that will not do so, but will be 
covered by revenue if the worker chooses low effort (i.e., a wage lower than 10). For the 
marginal effects, we therefore compare a wage midway the low surplus range (5) to one 
midway the high surplus range (35). The predicted marginal effects are remarkably 
                                                 
3 This figure is available from the authors. 
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similar for small and large markets.4 Though we cannot estimate the regressions for 
table 2 separately for each of the small markets (due to low numbers of observations), 
we can do so for large markets. The results show that the marginal effect is larger for 
DA than for BN in two of these markets and vice versa in the two other markets. We 
conclude that the aggregate difference is not statistically significant. Hence the 
difference in effort choices in BN compared to DA is not so much caused by distinct 
marginal reciprocal responses to wages but more by the differences in wages offered in 
BN and DA (see table 1). All in all, there do not appear to be differences in direct 
reciprocal responses to wages in DA and BN, but indirect reciprocity of previous effort 
choices in BN lead to higher wages than in DA and therefore to higher effort in BN. 
 Finally, consider the efficiency effects of the introduction of bilateral negotiations. 
The analysis of the efficiency of market institutions has a long tradition (Plott and Smith 
1978). We are interested in how the bilateral trading channel that is effectively present 
in labor markets affects efficiency. Here efficiency depends directly on effort levels. 
Because almost all possible trades (cf. Table 1) are realized, any differences in 
efficiency would be caused by distinct effort choices. 
 Figure 1 shows surplus and its division for the two market sizes, in rounds 1-10 and 
11-30.  
Figure 1:  Surplus division 
0
5
10
15
20
25
DA1-10 DA11-30 BN11-30 DA1-10 DA11-30 BN11-30
Small Markets Large Markets
worker firm
 
                                                 
4 Standard asymptotic assumptions underlying significance tests do not hold for such large steps. Hence, 
we cannot determine the significance of the differences between markets. Even if the marginal effect 
were to be statistically larger in one size market than in the other, the difference is still economically 
small, however. Moreover, note that for DA the effect is larger in small markets than in large markets 
whereas the reverse holds for BN.  
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Across all (nine) markets, aggregate surplus in rounds 11-30 is significantly higher than 
in rounds 1-10 at the 5% level for both the centralized market and the bilateral 
negotiations (MW, p=0.02 for both tests). Workers earn significantly more in bilateral 
negotiations than in markets with (p=0.02) and without (p=0.01) the presence of the 
bilateral negotiations. Differences between small and large markets are not significant at 
the 10% level. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We find that behavior is basically unaffected by the size of the market. Though market 
wages are suppressed by market forces in the large markets, neither indirect reciprocal 
responses (i.c., the way wage offers respond to a worker’s reputation) nor direct 
reciprocal tendencies (the way effort levels respond to wage offers) differ. As a 
consequence, the introduction of bilateral negotiations leads to similar efficiency 
increases for both market sizes. For the range of market size variation we consider, our 
evidence is, therefore, contrary to the notion that larger markets are characterized by 
more disconnectedness and less reciprocal behavior. Both gift-exchange as such and the 
enhanced gift-exchange that takes place in bilateral negotiations are robust to the 
market-size variations we investigate.  
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